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Summary findings
Countries differ in the extent to which their financial  finance by the relative size of stock aggregates, by
systems are bank-based or market-based. The financial  relative trading or transaction volumes, and by indicators
systems of Germany and Japan, for example, are  of relative efficiency.
considered bank-based because banks play a leading role  They show that in developing countries both banks
in mobilizing savings, allocating capital, overseeing  and stock markets are less developed, but financial
investment decisions of corporate managers, and  systems tend to be more bank-based. The richer the
providing risk management vehicles. The systems of the  country, the more active are all financial intermediaries.
United States and the United Kingdom are considered  The greater the development of a country's banks, the
more market-based.  tougher is the competition,  the greater is the efficiency,
Using bank-level data for a large number of industrial  and the lower are the bank margins and profits.
and developing countries, Demirgiuc-Kunt  and Huizinga  The more underdeveloped the stock market, the
present evidence about the impact of financial  greater are the bank profits. But financial structure per se
development and structure on bank performance. They  does not have a significant, independent influence on
measure the relative importance of bank or market  bank margins and profits.
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Countries  differ widely in their relative  reliance  on bank vs. market finance.
Germany  and Japan,  for instance,  are regarded  as bank-based,  as in these countries  the
volume  of bank lending  relative  to the stock  market is rather large. At the same  time,  the
United  States  and the United  Kingdom  are considered  to be more market-based.
Recently,  Demirguc-Kunt  and Levine (1999)  have constructed  indices  of the organization
of the financial  system,  or financial  structure,  for a large set of developing  and developed
countries. They  measure  the relative  importance  of bank vs. market finance  by the
relative  size of stock  aggregates,  by relative  trading or transaction  volumes,  and by
indicators  of relative efficiency. Developing  countries  are shown  to have less developed
banks and stock  markets in general. The financial  sector - banks,  other financial
intermediaries  and stock markets -becomes  larger,  more active  and more efficient,  as
countries  become  richer. Further,  in developing  countries  financial  systems  tend to be
more bank-based.
The variety of financial  systems around  the world poses economists  with several
interesting  questions. A substantial  body of literature  has already shown  that both
banking  sector  development  and stock  market development  may lead to higher growth  at
the firm,  industry  and country level. 2 However,  as discussed  in Stulz (1999),  financial
structure  - the relative importance  of banks vs. markets  - may also have important
implications  for firm performance  and long-run  economic  growth.  Demirguc-Kunt  and
2 See King  and Levine  (1993  a,b) and Levine  and  Zervos  (1998)  on evidence  regarding  fmancial
development  and  economic  growth. Rajan and  Zingales  (1998) show  that industries  that rely more heavily
on extemal  fmance  grow faster  in countries  with  better-developed  financial  systems. Demirguc-Kunt  and
Maksimnovic  (1998)  show that firms in countries  with an active  stock  market  and large  banking sector  grow
faster than  predicted  by individual  firm characteristics.
2Maksimovic (2000) and Levine (2000) analyze the impact of financial structure on firm
performance and economic growth, respectively.
In this paper we focus on the performance of the banking sector itself across
different financial systems. The purpose of this paper is twofold.  First, we investigate the
impact of financial development on bank profits and margins.  Second, after controlling
for the level of financial development, we examine if financial structure has an
independent impact on bank performance.  If banks operating in different financial
structures show differences in performance (especially bank margins), this could have
important implications for economic growth. After all, if financial structure differences
do not translate into differences in the cost of bank financing for firms, it becomes much
less clear that they are important.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper considering the impact of financial
structure on bank performance.  Using bank-level data for a large number of developed
and developing countries over the 1990-1997 period, we investigate if there is any
relationship between measures of bank performance on the one hand, and levels of bank
and stock market development, and financial structure on the other.
We consider two measures of bank performance: bank profitability (measured as
profits divided by assets), and bank interest margins (measured as net interest income
divided by assets). As an accounting identity, the bank interest margin equals (pre-tax)
profits plus bank operating costs, plus loan loss provisioning (and minus non-interest
income). Bank profitability and bank interest margins can be seen as indicators of the
(in)efficiency of the banking system, as they drive a wedge between the interest rate
received by savers on their deposits and the interest paid by lenders on their loans. As
3such, these variables will affect the cost of bank finance for firms, the range of
investment projects they find profitable and thus economic growth.
In general, we find that financial development has a very important impact on
bank performance. Simple means tests show that countries with underdeveloped financial
systems have significantly higher levels of bank profits and margins. Once we control
for the level of financial development, however, there is no significant difference in bank
profits or margins between bank-based and market-based systems.
These relationships are largely confirmed by regression analysis. Specifically, we
see that higher bank development is related to lower bank profitability and interest
margins. Lower profitability and lower interest margins should be reflections of increased
efficiency due to greater competition among banks.  Stock market development on the
other hand, leads to increased profits and margins for banks especially at lower levels of
financial development, indicating complementarities between bank and stock market
finance.  Stock market development may improve bank performance, for instance, as
stock markets generate information about firms that is also useful to banks. Alternatively,
the legal and regulatory environment that makes stock market development possible may
also improve the functioning of banks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data.
Section 3 presents the empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
2.  The  data
This study  combines  bank-level  data on profitability,  interest  margins  and other
bank-level variables with cross-country data on financial structure. Our bank-level data
4are derived from bank balance sheets and income statements, as available from the
BankScope data base compiled by Fitch IBCA. The data set covers all OECD countries
as well as many developing countries. For a list of countries included in this study, see
Table 1. Bank coverage is comprehensive for most countries with covered banks roughly
accounting for 90 percent of all bank assets worldwide. The sample covers the period
1990-1997.
Table I also provides mean values of the bank-level variables used in the
empirical work for each country separately. Profit/ta is computed as pre-tax profits
divided by total assets. Two countries, Argentina and Finland, experienced on average
negative bank profits over this sample period. Notably low also is the average
profitability of Japanese banks at 0.2 percent of assets. Next, Net Margin/ta is net interest
income divided by total assets. Thus, Net Margin/ta is an ex post interest margin that
differs from the ex ante interest margin (simply the loan interest rate minus the deposit
interest rate) because of possible loan defaults. The Net Margin/ta variable thus adjusts
for the fact that banks that charge high interest rates may experience equally high loan
default rates. Lowest values of Net Margins/ta are obtained by several developed
countries, notably Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. Apart from low
loan default rates, low Net Margin/ta can reflect low operating costs, and low (pre-tax)
profitability. Overhead/ta is defined as a bank's non-interest expenses (mostly wages)
divided by total assets. Countries with low Net Margin/ta indeed tend to also have low
Overhead/ta. In the sample average values for profit and margin are 1.3 percent and 3.9
percent, respectively.
5Next, the table provides  information  about  several  balance  sheet  items.  These
balance  sheets  items are direct  indicators  of the earning  power  and the cost side of banks.
Hence,  in empirical  work relating  bank profitability  and  interest  margins  to financial
structure  variables,  we use bank-level  variables  derived  from  balance  sheet  as controls.
Equity/ta  is defined  as book equity  divided  by total assets.  International  variation  in
Equity/ta  reflects  differences  in capital  adequacy  as well as different  definitions  of book
equity. Loan/ta  is defined  as total loans  divided  by total assets,  while  Non-Interest
Earning  Assets/ta  is defined  as cash,  real estate  and other  non-interest  earning  assets
divided  by total assets.  Finally,  Customer  & Short  Term  Funding/ta  is deposits  and other
short-term  funding  divided  by total assets.
Country  averages  of the financial  development  and structure  variables  are
presented  in Table 2. First,  there are three size variables. Bank/gdp  is the ratio of the
total domestic  assets of deposit  money  banks  divided  by GDP, providing  a measure  of the
overall  size of the banking  sector.  From  the table,  we see  that richer countries  generally
have  larger banking  sectors.  Next, Central  bank/gdp  is defined  as the total assets of the
central  bank divided  by GDP. Several  developing  countries  (Bolivia,  Jordan,  Nigeria,
and Panama)  stand  out with central  bank assets exceeding  20 percent  of GDP, while  the
size of central  bank assets  tends  to be far more  modest  for developed  countries. Thus in
developing  countries,  the central  bank  plays a relatively  large role in credit  provision. As
a final index  of financial  size,  Mcap/gdp  is the stock  market  capitalization  divided  by
GDP. Again,  there is a general  tendency  for richer countries  to have larger stock  markets.
Some  developing  countries,  notably  Malaysia,  Chile and  Jordan, also  have well-
developed  stock  markets.
6Next, the table contains two variables reflecting the volume or activity of the
banking sector and the stock market, respectively. Bank credit/gdp is the credit to the
private sector by deposit money banks divided by GDP. Hence, this variable proxies for
the credit activity of the banking system. As seen, credit in Japan is relatively important
at 117 percent of GDP. It is similarly very important in Switzerland (at 165 percent) and
the United Kingdom (at 113 percent), which are countries with major international
banking sectors. Poorer countries are shown to have comparatively little credit activity.
Next, Tvt/gdp is the total value of stocks traded divided by GDP, as an indicator of stock
market activity. Some developing countries, such as Bolivia, Guatemala, Nepal, Nigeria,
Paraguay and Zambia, have hardly any stock market activity at all at 0.2 percent of GDP
or less. Among the developed countries, Austria, Greece, and Italy also have relatively
dormant stock markets with trading volume at less than 10 percent of GDP.
In the empirical work, we also examine how the performance of the banking
sector (in terms of profits and the net interest margin) is related to the relative
development of the banks and stock markets of bank and stock markets. To capture
whether a financial system is bank-based or market-based, we use an index of financial
structure constructed by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999). Specifically, this Structure
index is the means-removed average of relative size, relative activity and relative
efficiency measures. Relative size here is calculated as the ratio of the stock market
capitalization to total assets of deposit money banks; relative activity is defined as the
total value of stocks traded divided by bank credit to the private sector; relative
efficiency, finally,  is given by the product of total value traded and average overhead
costs of banks in the country.  Higher values of Structure indicate a more market-based
7financial  system. We classify countries  with values of the Structure  variable  above
(below)  the mean as market-based  (bank-based)  financial  systems.  Further,  Market  is a
dummy  variable  that  takes the value 1 for market-based  systems  and 0 for bank-based
systems. The table shows  that there is wide variation  in financial  structure  within income
groups  as well as across  income groups.
3.  Empirical  evidence
This section  presents  empirical  evidence  on the relationship  between  bank
performance  and financial  structure.  As an initial look at this relationship,  Panel  A of
Table 3 provides  the mean values of the Profit/ta  and Net Margin/ta  variables  for bank-
based and market-based  systems separately.  The figures  show  that both profits and
margins  of banks are lower in market-based  financial  systems,  although  only the
difference  in margins  is statistically  significant  at the 5-percent  level. These  mean figures
can be misleading,  however,  since  they do not control  for the development  of the
financial  sector  or other determinants  of profits and  margins.
In Panel B of Table 3, we look at differences  in means for three groups  of
countries:  underdeveloped,  bank-based  and market-based  financial  systems. A country's
financial  system  is classified  as underdeveloped  if its bank and stock  markets  are both
underdeveloped.  A country's banking system  or stock  market, in turn, is considered
underdeveloped  if Bank credit/gdp  or Tvt/gdp are below the sample  mean,  respectively.
Accordingly,  we now only classify  financial  systems  as bank-based  or market-based  if
the financial  system  is not deemed  underdeveloped.  This three-way  classification  points
at a real difference  between developed  and underdeveloped  financial  systems. Indeed,
8bank margins and profits decline significantly, as financial systems become developed.
Further, bank profits and margins are higher in market-based systems than in bank-based
systems, although these differences are not statistically significant.
Next, we study these relationships more formally within a regression setting.  Our
empirical framework extends the work in Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) on the
determinants of bank profitability and interest margins to include indices of financial
structure. The basic regression equation is as follows
Iij=X  +  PBj+  yXj+  SSj+  ijJ  (1)
where I ij is the independent variable (either Profit/ta or Net Margin/ta) for bank i in
country j; B jt are bank variables for bank i; X j are country variables for country  j; S j
are financial development and structure variables for country j; and ej, is an error term.
Versions of (1) are estimated with either bank-level data or country-level data. The bank-
level specifications use bank mean values over the sample period for each bank. Country-
level specifications instead  use country mean values for bank and other variables. We
report White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.  Detailed variable definitions
and sources are provided in the Appendix.
Table 4 reports the results of Profit/ta regressions along the lines of equation (1).
In the first three specifications we include bank and stock market size measures among
the independent variables to control for the level of financial development, while in the
last  three specifications we include activity measures instead. Specifications 1 and 4 use
bank-level data, and the rest of the specifications use country-level data. We also try two
9different  measures  of financial  structure.  Specifications  (1) and (2) use the Structure
index. In specification  (3) we replace  Structure  by Market,  which, as indicated,  is a
dummy  variable  based  on Structure.
In Table 4, the bank-level  and macroeconomic  independent  variables  are the same
across all specifications.  Consistent  with the evidence  in Demirguc-Kunt  and Huizinga
(1999),  Profit/ta  is positively  related  to the lagged  equity  variable,  Equity/ta  t-1. This may
indicate that well-capitalized  banks face  lower expected  bankruptcy  costs for themselves
and their customers,  thereby  reducing  their cost of funding. Profits  appear  to decline  with
a greater  proportion  of Non-Interest  Earning  Assets/ta. Customer  and short term funding
develops  mixed  results  in bank-level  versus country-level  specifications. On average,
this type of customer  funding  may carry a low interest cost, but it is costly in terms of the
required  branching  network.  The Overhead/ta  variable  fails  to be significant,  suggesting
that banks can fully  pass on their non-interest  expenses  to their customers.
The macro  variables  are mostly  insignificant  except  for inflation  which  is
significant  and positive  throughout.  This suggests  that banks tend to profit in inflationary
environments.  We also see that Profit/ta  is significantly  and positively related  to Tax Rate
in the bank-level  specifications.  Tax rate is the effective  tax rate on bank income
constructed  as the ratio of a bank's tax liability  to its pre-tax  profits. The positive
coefficient  on the Tax Rate variable  suggests  that banks in high-tax environments  have to
earn  higher pre-tax  profits  to pay these taxes. This also suggests  that banks are able  to
pass on at least  part of their taxes  to their customers. 3
3 Demirguc-Kunt  and Huizinga  (forthcoming)  examine  how the pass-through  of taxes  by banks  to their
customers  depends  on whether  the bank is domestic  or foreign.
10Next, we turn to the financial  system  variables.  We want to explore the role of
financial  structure  on bank performance,  while  controlling  for the level of bank and stock
market  development.  In the first three specifications,  we control  for financial
development  by including Bank/gdp,  Central  bank/gdp,  and Mcap/gdp,  as indicators  of
(central)  bank and stock market  size.  In the last three specifications,  we instead  include
Bank  credit/gdp  and Tvt/gdp as indicators  of bank and stock  market activity.
In all specifications,  we see that private  bank development  measures,  whether
relating  to size or activity, have  negative  signs, with statistically  significant  coefficients
in four  of the six regressions.  This may  suggest  that banks in a well-developed  banking
market face  tougher competition,  and therefore  lower  profitability.  We also see that
Central bank/gdp  enters with a positive  coefficient. Since a high level of central bank
activity  is an indicator  of lower (private)  financial  system  development  this is consistent
with the previous  result (see also Demiguc-Kunt  and Levine, 1999).
Next, we see that Mcap/gdp  and Tvt/gdp  both obtain  positive and significant  signs
in all specifications.  This suggests  that controlling  for the level of bank development  in
countries  with well-developed  stock  markets  banks have greater  profit opportunities.
Why would stock  market development  ever  increase  bank profitability?  A possible
explanation  is that stock market  development  allows  firms  to be better-capitalized,
thereby  reducing  risks of loan default.  Also, at a higher level of stock  market
development,  much information  on publicly  traded firms  is made available  that also
enables  banks to better evaluate  credit risk. However,  the impact  of stock market
development  on bank performance  is not linear. Specifically,  when we add a squared
term of stock market development  into our specifications,  this squared  term enters with a
11negative  and significant  coefficient.  This suggests  that at some  point  the potential  gains
of stock  market development  for bank performnance  have  been realized.  After  this point, it
may become  immaterial  whether further  financial  development  takes the form of bank
market  or stock  market development  (as is consistent  with the Demirguc-Kunt  and
Maksimovic,  1996).
In specifications  1,2 and 4,5 we include  the Structure  index to capture  whether a
country  is market-based  or bank-based. Structure  enters all four specifications  with a
negative  sign,  but it is only significant  in the country-level  regressions  in specifications  2
and 5. This suggests  that after controlling  for the level of financial  development,  there is
some  evidence  that a more market-based  financial  structure  would  lead  to lower levels of
bank  profits. However,  the correlations  between  the Structure  index and measures  of
stock  market  development  tend  to be very high at over 80 percent. Therefore,  in
specifications  3 and 6 we replace  the Structure  variable  with the Market  dummy  variable,
with lower  levels of correlation  with our stock  market  indicators  at about 60 percent.
Using  this indicator  of financial  structure,  we no longer see a significant  effect of
financial  structure  on bank profits.
Table  5 presents  the results  of the Net Margin/ta  regressions.  Apart  from the
different  dependent  variables,  the regressions  in Tables  4 and 5 are completely  analogous.
Clearly,  Profits/ta  and Net Margin/ta  are interrelated,  as a bank's net interest income is a
major determinant  of its profitability. 4 The Net Margin/ta  variable  perhaps  more
accurately  reflects  how financial  structure  affects  the bank's financial  customers
(depositors  and lenders)  rather  than the bank itself. However,  most of the results in Table
4 To be precise,  pre-tax profits  are equal  to net interest  income,  plus non-interest  income,  minus overhead,
minus  loan loss provisioning  by the income  statement  identity.
124 and 5 are similar.  In our discussion  of Table  5, we will therefore  focus on how the
results  in Table 5 differ from those in Table  4.
Starting  with the bank-level  variables,  we see that the coefficient  of Loan/ta  is
positive  and significant  in three specifications.  This sensibly  reflects  that loans  are
interest-paying  (as opposed  to say the cash on the balance  sheet),  thereby increasing  net
interest  income.  Overhead/ta enters all specifications  with positive coefficients  which are
significant  in four cases. This suggests  that banks pass on their non-interest  expenses,
such as wages,  to their financial  customers  (in terms of lower  deposit  rates and/or  higher
lending  rates).
Turning  to the financial  structure  variables,  we see that the results  in Table 5 are
largely  similar  to Table  4. Looking at the separate  bank and stock  market variables,  we
see that they are significant  with the same signs  as before.  The Structure  index  is again
negative  throughout  but now only significant  in one specification.  When  replaced  with
the Market  variable,  the impact  of financial  structure  on bank margins  is no longer
significant.
Our raw data indicate  that bank profits and margins  tend to be relatively  high in
underdeveloped  financial  systems  regardless  of financial  structure.  This suggests  that
financial  structure  is particularly  important  at lower  levels of economic  development.  To
test whether  this is the case,  we estimate regressions  as in Tables  4 and 5 including  an
interaction  term of the Structure  variable  and gdp per capita.  The interaction  term is not
statistically  significant  and leaves  the other results  unchanged  in the unreported
regressions.
13As an additional  test, we include  several  institutional  variables  reflecting  the legal
and regulatory  environment  to the various specifications.  We include  these institutional
variables  as controls  since  they can be expected  to have a direct impact  on bank
profitability.  To a large  extent, the institutional  environment  is expected  to shape  the
financial  structure,  and therefore  the impact  of financial  structure  may be weaker  after we
control  for the underlying  institutional  environment.  Indeed,  there is no clear role left for
financial  structure,  after we include  measures  of legal code and effectiveness  and
restrictions  on bank activities. 5 These results  are also not reported.
5.  Conclusion
The empirical  evidence  of this paper suggests  that banks have higher  profits and
margins  in underdeveloped  financial  systems.  Once we control  for the level of financial
development,  financial  structure,  i.e. the relative  development  of banks  versus markets,
does  not have  an independent  effect on bank profitability  or margins.  In developed
financial  systems,  bank profits and margins  are indeed  not statistically  different  across
bank-based  systems  and market-based  systems.
Regression  results  indicate  that greater  bank development  lowers  bank profits and
margins.  Underdeveloped  banking  markets tend to be rife with resource-costly
inefficiencies  and less-than-competitive  pricing  behavior,  as also suggested  by their
relatively  high profitability  and net interest  margins. Thus greater  bank development
brings  about  tougher  competition,  higher efficiency  and lower  profits.
5 As institutional  measures  we have used indicators  of Stockholder  rights, Creditor  rights,  Contract
enforcement,  Common  Law, and Restrictions  on Banking.  See  the appendix  for definitions.
14We also see that in underdeveloped  financial  systems  stock  market development
improves  bank  profits and margins.  This reflects the complementarities  between  bank
and stock  market development.  Specifically,  stock market  development  and the improved
availability  of equity  financing  to firms may  increase  their borrowing  capacity.
Furthermore,  the better  and more easily available  information  which stock  markets
demand also enables  banks to better evaluate  credit  risk. This can lead  to an increase  in
bank profits. However,  at higher  levels of stock  market development  we no longer
observe  these complementarities.
Overall,  our results provide  evidence  that differences  in bank and stock  market
development  do translate  into differences  in the cost of bank financing  for firms. Indeed,
for countries  with underdeveloped  financial  systems,  greater financial  development
would improve  the efficiency  of the banking  sector, potentially  leading to increases  in
growth, both at the micro or firm level and at the macro level.  However,  we find that
financial  structure  per se does not have  a significant,  independent  influence  on bank
profits and margins.
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assets.  Data  are from Bankscope  data base  of IBCA. Detailed  variable  definitions  are given  in the Appendix.
Profit/ta  Net  Overhead/ta Equity/ta  Loan/ta  Non-interest  earning Customer& short
Margin/ta  assets/ta  term funding/ta
Argentina  -0.004  0.052  0.076  0.197  0.548  0.215  0.656
Australia  0.010  0.021  0.024  0.068  0.710  0.055  0.780
Austria  0.008  0.018  0.029  0.080  0.423  0.052  0.803
Belgium  0.005  0.018  0.022  0.072  0.301  0.031  0.889
Bolivia  0.014  0.048  0.045  0.117  0.670  0.057  0.848
Canada  0.003  0.019  0.021  0.090  0.694  0.041  0.844
Chile  0.006  0.041  0.031  0.155  0.545  0.153  0.746
Colombia  0.020  0.066  0.083  0.164  0.597  0.153  0.732
Demnark  0.013  0.047  0.035  0.105  0.526  0.036  0.825
Ecuador  0.018  0.069  0.078  0.133  0.530  0.117  0.679
Finland  -0.030  0.015  0.023  0.070  0.446  0.092  0.633
France  0.003  0.029  0.036  0.100  0.488  0.056  0.768
Greece  0.009  0.029  0.037  0.076  0.389  0.084  0.868
Guatemala  0.009  0.062  0.059  0.096  0.487  0.165  0.695
Honduras  0.031  0.076  0.044  0.109  0.552  0.124  0.779
India  0.002  0.030  0.028  0.053  0.445  0.071  0.868
Indonesia  0.016  0.040  0.028  0.115  0.686  0.038  0.759
Ireland  0.010  0.017  0.011  0.144  0.496  0.033  0.849
Italy  0.010  0.033  0.038  0.092  0.455  0.066  0.742
Japan  0.002  0.019  0.014  0.038  0.708  0.032  0.882
Jordan  0.010  0.024  0.025  0.093  0.436  0.099  0.854
Kenya  0.018  0.049  0.040  0.102  0.560  0.127  0.826
Korea  0.003  0.021  0.026  0.084  0.554  0.102  0.751
Malaysia  0.017  0.027  0.015  0.082  0.590  0.093  0.815
Mexico  0.012  0.043  0.046  0.177  0.568  0.126  0.773
Nepal  0.034  0.044  0.024  0.072  0.519  0.060  0.865
Netherlands  0.007  0.014  0.014  0.090  0.451  0.029  0.776
N. Zealand  0.013  0.025  0.025  0.041  0.753  0.045  0.886
Nigeria  0.025  0.059  0.084  0.092  0.260  0.139  0.675
Norway  0.009  0.027  0.023  0.057  0.771  0.041  0.800
Panama  0.015  0.027  0.020  0.101  0.629  0.046  0.849
Paraguay  0.023  0.067  0.067  0.137  0.548  0.227  0.822
Peru  0.018  0.072  0.082  0.121  0.571  0.125  0.803
Philippines  0.023  0.043  0.041  0.159  0.589  0.072  0.693
Singapore  0.014  0.021  0.012  0.153  0.579  0.163  0.828
S. Africa  0.019  0.046  0.038  0.155  0.768  0.027  0.788
Sri Lanka  0.023  0.041  0.038  0.135  0.529  0.091  0.662
Swaziland  0.020  0.058  0.062  0.065  0.647  0.066  0.876
Sweden  0.004  0.022  0.022  0.056  0.390  0.065  0.762
Switzerland  0.015  0.017  0.045  0.183  0.521  0.048  0.629
Thailand  0.008  0.028  0.019  0.073  0.841  0.039  0.857
UK  0.014  0.028  0.028  0.135  0.385  0.076  0.744
US  0.017  0.039  0.036  0.081  0.603  0.088  0.741
Zambia  0.045  0.119  0.123  0.131  0.240  0.237  0.768
Average  0.013  0.039  0.039  0.106  0.545  0.089  0.784
17Table  H.  Financial  Development  and  Structure
Data  are averages  for the period  1990-97. Detailed  definitions  and sources  are given  in the Appendix.
Banklgdp Central bank/gdp  Mcap/gdp  Bank  creditlgdp  Tvtlgdp  Structure  Market
Argentina  0.216  0.034  0.130  0.164  0.043  -0.104  0
Australia  0.767  0.030  0.713  0.696  0.331  0.111  1
Austria  1.261  0.004  0.123  0.932  0.078  -0.284  0
Belgium  1.175  0.013  0.355  0.563  0.052  -0.191  0
Bolivia  0.367  0.224  0.017  0.357  0.000  -0.389  0
Canada  0.656  0.039  0.588  0.565  0.292  0.091  1
Chile  0.465  0.197  0.838  0.451  0.085  0.321  1
Colombia  0.177  0.020  0.132  0.158  0.014  -0.033  0
Denmark  0.475  0.016  0.340  0.375  0.157  0.036  1
Ecuador  0.175  0.094  0.104  0.170  0.013  -0.217  0
Finland  0.799  0.010  0.295  0.771  0.118  -0.144  0
France  1.021  0.011  0.329  0.887  0.170  -0.171  0
Greece  0.413  0.193  0.149  0.183  0.058  -0.171  0
Guatemala  0.145  0.011  0.009  0.123  0.000  -0.399  0
Honduras  0.253  0.073  0.049  0.208  0.020  -0.249  0
India  0.344  0.129  0.277  0.242  0.076  0.022  1
Indonesia  0.492  0.020  0.184  0.460  0.077  -0.168  0
Ireland  0.361  0.010  0.265  0.293  0.141  -0.024  0
Italy  0.740  0.103  0.166  0.521  0.076  -0.228  0
Japan  1.311  0.047  0.792  1.169  0.284  -0.063  0
Jordan  0.713  0.211  0.649  0.620  0.124  0.028  1
Kenya  0.288  0.114  0.160  0.212  0.005  -0.146  0
Korea  0.551  0.011  0.372  0.532  0.439  0.142  1
Malaysia  0.816  0.012  2.015  0.748  1.140  1.301  1
Mexico  0.240  0.015  0.318  0.215  0.126  0.297  1
Nepal  0.216  0.111  0.050  0.162  0.002  -0.331  0
Nedterlands  1.116  0.009  0.686  0.904  0.428  -0.012  0
N. Zealand  0.852  0.034  0.493  0.779  0.143  -0.103  0
Nigeria  0.110  0.201  0.058  0.083  0.001  -0.163  0
Norway  0.689  0.018  0.256  0.574  0.143  -0.142  0
Panama  0.576  0.206  0.086  0.558  0.003  -0.339  0
Paraguay  0.164  0.069  0.020  0.163  0.002  -0.361  0
Peru  0.134  0.003  0.145  0.116  0.050  0.097  1
Philippines  0.367  0.092  0.516  0.281  0.150  0.290  1
Singapore  0.952  1.365  0.829  0.702  0.399  1
S. Africa  0.662  0.028  1.658  0.613  0.148  0.629  1
Sri Lanka  0.271  0.097  0.161  0.211  0.021  -0.149  0
Swaziland  0.207  0.003  0.181  0.202  0.056  0.049  1
Sweden  0.537  0.060  0.623  0.460  0.332  0.347  1
Switzerland  1.769  0.015  0.981  1.647  0.755  0.008  1
Thailand  0.824  0.015  0.570  0.784  0.400  0.066  1
UK  1.160  0.030  1.126  1.137  0.551  0.149  1
US  0.731  0.050  0.799  0.644  0.616  0.319  1
Zambia  0.118  0.483  0.074  0.062  0.002  -0.303  0
Average  0.600  0.068  0.483  0.512  0.221  -0.006  0.477
18Table III. Bank Performance and Financial Structure
Countries  with  underdeveloped  fnancial systems  have below  mean values  for both  bank and market
development.  Countries  are defned to have  market-based  financial  systems  if the value  of their structure
index is above  the sample  mean.  Structure  index is the means-removed  average  of relative  size,  relative
activity  and relative  efficiency  indicators  as defined  in Demirguc-Kunt  and  Levine  (1999). Superscripts
a,b,c,d  and e denote  pairs  that are significantly  different  at 5 percent or lower  significance  level.
N  Mean  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum
Panel  A:
Bank-Based
Profit/ta  23  .014  .015  -.030  .045
Net Margin/ta  23  .045*  .025  .015  .119
Market -Based
Profit/ta  21  .012  .006  .002  .023
Net Margin/ta  21  .032a  .015  .014  .072
Panel  B:
Underdeveloped
Profit/ta  19  .018 "e  .011  -.005  .045
Net Margin/ta  19  .055 bc  .022  .017  .119
Developed and Bank-Based
Profit/ta  10  .005d  .013  -.030  .016
Net Margin/ta  10  .0 2 5b  .008  .015  .040
Developed  and  Market-Based
Profit/ta  15  .010e  .005  .003  .019
Net Margin/ta  15  .027c  .011  .014  .047
19Table IV. Bank Profitability and Financial Structure
Columns  (1) and (4) are estimated  using mean values for each bank for the 1990-97  time period. Columns  (2) and (5) are
estimated  using  country  means  over the sample period.  Columns  (3) and (6) replace  Structure  in specifications  (2) and (5) by
Market.  Dependent  variable  is profit/ta  which  is before  tax profits divided  by total assets.  Detailed  variable  definitions  and data
sources  are given  in the appendix. White's heteroskedasticity  consistent  standard  errors are given in  parentheses.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Bank  Level  and Macro  Controls
Equity/ta  t  .024***  .059  .065  .026***  .096**  .092**
(.008)  (.041)  (.052)  (.008)  (.043)  (.044)
Loanhta  -.002  .000  .002  .000  .004  -.001
(.003)  (.008)  (.008)  (.003)  (.008)  (.008)
Non-interest  -.026*  -.078**  -.078*  -.026*  -.068**  -.073**
earning  assets/ta  (.015)  (.039)  (.044)  (.015)  (.031).  (.035)
Customer  &short  -.009**  .042  .043  ..007*  .062**  .068**
term fundinglta  (.004)  (.035)  (.036)  (.004)  (.031)  (.034)
Overhead/ta  .025  .136  .155  .009  .079  .135
(.053)  (.130)  (.144)  (.054)  (.121)  (.137)
Gnp/cap  .0003***  .000  .000  .000  .000  -.000
(.0001)  (.000)  (.000)  (.000)  (.000)  (.000)
Growth  .001**  .000  .000  .001  -.001  -.000
(.000)  (.001)  (.001)  (°000)  (.001)  (.001)
Inflation  .001***  .001**  .001**  .001***  .001**  .001**
(.000)  (.000)  (.000)  (.000)  (.000)  (.000)
Tax  rate  .004**  .001  .005  .005**  .001  -.001
(.002)  (.013)  (.018)  (.002)  (.011)  (.012)
Financial  Development  and Structure
Bank/gdp  -.011***  -.010*  -.003
(.003)  (.006)  (.005)
Central  bank/gdp  .055***  .019  .027*
(.011)  (.014)  (.014)
Bank credit/gdp  -.011***  -.010*  -.006
(.003)  (.006)  (.006)
Mcapfgdp  .011***  .015**  .005**
(.003)  (.006)  (.002)
Tvt/gdp  .019***  .029***  .020**
(.004)  (.009)  (.008)
Structure  -.002  -.018*  -.002  -.015**
(.004)  (.010)  (.004)  (.006)
Market  -. 003  -. 005
(.003)  (.003)
Adj R 2 .10  .35  .32  .10  .43  .39
N. of countries  43  43  43  44  44  44
N. of obs  2237  43  43  2249  44  44
** and *** indicate  significance  levels of 10,  5 and 1  percent  respectively.
20Table V. Bank Interest Margins and Financial Structure
Columns  (I) and (4) are estimated  using mean values for each bank for the 1990-97  time period. Columns  (2) and (5) are
estimated  using country  means  over the sample  period.  Columns  (3) and (6) replace  Structure  in specifications  (2) and (5) by
Market. Dependent  variable is the net margin/ta  defined  as interest income minus interest expense over total assets.Detailed
variable  definitions  and data  sources  are given in the appendix. White's heteroskedasticity  consistent  standard  errors  are given
in parentheses.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Bank  Level  and Macro  Controls
Equity/ta  t  .024***  .021  .026  .026***  .028  .023
(.008)  (.035)  (.037)  (.008)  (.036)  (.036)
Loan/ta  -.002  .013  .015*  .000  .022**  .020**
(.003)  (.009)  (.009)  (.003)  (.008).  (.008)
Non-interest  -.026*  .023  .025  -.026*  .038  .039
earning  assets/ta  (.015)  (.032)  (.036)  (.015)  (.028)  (.029)
Customer  &short  -.009**  .031*  .031*  -.007*  .030*  .031*
term funding/ta  (.004)  (.017)  (.018)  (.004)  (.017)  (.018)
Overhead/ta  .025  .452***  .474***  .009  .437***  .459*  **
(.053)  (.129)  (.151)  (.054)  (.136)  (.143)
Gnp/cap  .0003***  .000  -.000  .000  .000  -.000
(.0001)  (.000)  (.000)  (.000)  (.000)  (.000)
Growth  .001**  -.000  -.001  .001  -.001  -.001
(.000)  (.001)  (.001)  (.000)  (.001)  (.001)
Inflation  .001***  .001**  .001**  .00°l**  .00°°  .00°°
(.000)  (.000)  (.000)  (.000)  (.000)  (.000)
Tax  rate  .004**  .013  .018  .005**  .016  .016
(.002)  (.012)  (.016)  (.002)  (.011)  (.016)
Financial  Development  and Structure
Bank/gdp  -.0l1***  -.023***  -.015**
(.003)  (.007)  (.006)
Central  bank/gdp  .055**  .006  .016
(.011)  (.017)  (.018)
Bank  creditlgdp  -.011 *  -.015**  -.013**
(.003)  (.007)  (.006)
Mcap/gdp  .011***  .016***  .004**
(.003)  (.005)  (.002)
Tvt/gdp  .019***  .011*  .006*
(.004)  (.006)  (.004)
Structure  -.002  -.021**  -.002  -.007
(.004)  (.008)  (.004)  (.005)
Market  -.003  .002
(.003)  (.003)
Adj R 2 .10  .87  .85  .10  .86  .85
N. of countries  43  43  43  44  44  44
N. of obs  2237  43  43  2249  44  44
** and *** indicate  significance  levels  of 10,  5 and 1 percent  respectively.
21Appendix
Variable Definitions and Sources
Bank Characteristics
Net margin/ta - interest income minus interest expense over total assets.
Profit/ta -before tax profits over total assets.
Equity/ta  - book value of equity  (assets  minus liabilities)  over total assets
Loan/ta - total loans over total assets
Non-interest earning assets/ta - cash, non-interest earning deposits at other banks, and
other non-interest  earning assets over total assets
Customer & short term funding/ta - all short term and long term deposits plus other non-
deposit  short term funding  over total assets
Overhead/ta  - personnel  expenses  and some  other  non-interest  expenses  over total assets
All bank level variables  are obtained  from BankScope  data  base of IBCA.
Macro Indicators
Gnp/cap - real GNP per capita.
Growth - annual growth rate of real GDP.
Iinflation - the annual inflation from the GDP deflator.
The above data are from World Bank  National  Accounts.
Tax  rate -total taxes paid divided  by before tax profits for each bank, obtained  from
Bankscope.
Financial  Structure
Bank/gdp -total assets of the deposit money banks divided by GDP.
Central bank/gdp - total assets of the central bank divided by GDP.
Bank credit/gdp  - credit  to the private sector  by deposit  money  banks divided  by GDP.
Mcap/gdp - stock market capitalization divided by GDP.
Tvt/gdp - total value of stocks traded divided by GDP.
22Mcap/bank - stock market capitalization divided by total assets of the deposit money
banks.
Tvt/bank credit - total value of stocks traded divided by bank credit to private sector.
Tvt*overhead costs - total value of stocks traded multiplied by average overhead/ta of
banks in the country.
Structure - means-removed average of Mcap/bank, Tvtlbank credit and Tvt*overhead
costs, as described in Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999).  Higher levels indicate more
market-based systems.
The above variables are constructed as described in Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine
(1999).  Stock market information are from the Emerging Markets data base of the
International Finance Corporation. The rest are from the International Financial Statistics
of the International Monetary Fund.
Legal and Institutional Indicators
Stockholder rights - an index of shareholder rights from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer and Vishny (1998). The index is formed by adding 1 if: (1) the country allows
the shareholders to mail their proxy to the firm; (2) shareholders are not required to
deposit their shares prior to the General Shareholders' Meeting; (3) cumulative voting or
proportional representation of minorities in the board of directors is allowed; (4) an
oppressed minorities mechanism is in place; (5) the minimum percentage of share capital
that entitles a shareholder to call for an Extraordinary Shareholders' Meeting is less than
or equal to 10 percent (the sample median); or (6) shareholders have preemptive rights
that can only be waived by a shareholders' vote. The index ranges from 1 to 6.
Creditor rights - an index of creditor rights from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and
Vishny (1998). The index is formed by adding 1 if: (1) the country imposes restrictions,
such as creditors' consent or minimum dividends to file for reorganization; (2) secured
creditors are able to gain possession of their security once the reorganization petition has
been approved (no automatic stay); (3) secured creditors are ranked first in the
distribution of the proceeds that result from the disposition of assets of a bankrupt firm;
and (4) the debtor does not retain the administration of its property pending the resolution
of the reorganization. The index ranges from 0 to 4.
Contract enforcement index - produced by Business Environmental Risk Intelligence
(BERI), this index measures the "relative degree to which contractual agreements are
honored and complications presented by language and mentality differences." It is scored
14,  with higher scores for greater enforceability.
Common Law - A dummy variable that takes the value one for comnmon  law countries and the
value zero otherwise. The source is La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998).
23Restrictions on Banking - An aggregate index of restrictions on banking business, including
securities underwriting, insurance underwriting, real estate, and owning and controlling
nonfinancial firms.  Ranges from 1 to 4, with higher scores indicating tighter restrictions.
Source: Barth, Caprio and Levine (1998).
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